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INNOVATION HELD HOSTAGE: HAS FEDERAL
INTERVENTION STIFLED EFFORTS TO REFORM
THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM?
Vivek S. Sankaran*

The past thirty years have been marked by an increasedfederalization of child welfare law, which, like other areas of family law, traditionally remained within the
sole purview of state legislatures. Despite increased oversight by the federal government, outcomes for foster children remain unacceptably poor The number of
children in foster care has more than doubled over the past twenty-five years and
reports of suspected maltreatment have skyrocketed. Children continue to stay too
long in care and have too many placements. Case workers assigned to work with
families and attorneys representing parents and children are overwhelmed and
rarely provide meaningful assistance. State courts face pressures to move cases
through a busy docket rather than spend the time needed to make informed decisions about individual children. Many child welfare systems are or have been
subject to court monitoring after evidence that the systems violated the constitutional and statutory rights offamilies.
This Article explores the unintended consequences of federal involvement in child
welfare policy and argues that federal involvement in dictating the substance of
child welfare policy must be minimized to spark the vigorous debate and innovation needed to reform child welfare systems. The Articlefirst explores the significant
growth in federal laws affecting the foster care system over the past thirty years.
Then, it discusses the unintended consequences of this growth, primarily its impact
on stifling much needed innovative approaches and rigorous debate in the area.
Finally, the Article proposes that the federal government s role in child protection
issues should be limited to four areas: 1) supporting, not supplanting, the states'
responsibility to design systems to meet the needs of theirfamilies; 2) ensuring that
states protect the constitutional rights of parents and children; 3) resolving interstate issues affecting children that cannot be adequately addressed by individual
states; and 4) providing research and technical assistance to states as they design
their policies.

INTRODUCTION

The past thirty years have been marked by an increased federalization of child welfare law, which, like other areas of family law,
traditionally remained within the sole purview of state legislatures.
In 1974, the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
*
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("CAPTA")' represented the federal government's first major effort
to assuage growing concerns over abused and neglected children.
Since that time, the federal government has enacted a plethora of
legislation to manage aspects of child welfare. The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act ("AACWA"),2 the Adoption and Safe
Families Act ("ASFA"),' the Multi-Ethnic Placement Act ("MEPA") ,4

and the Foster Care Independence Act ("The Chafee Act") 5 only
represent a sampling of the ways in which the federal government
manages state child welfare systems. The Department of Health
and Human Services has developed detailed regulations to administer federal statutes, and a vast machinery now exists in
Washington, D.C. to manage federal child welfare programs. 6
For the most part, federal involvement in child abuse and neglect cases has been welcomed. Federal intervention in child
protection matters has attracted much needed attention to the
plight of abused and neglected children, substantially increased
funding for foster care systems, and sparked procedural changes,
such as appointing guardians ad litem to represent the interests of
foster children,' convening timely court hearings" and forcing state
courts and agencies to consider a child's permanency needs. The
federal government has commissioned reports and studies on child
1.
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4
(amended and reauthorized by the Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-36, 117 Stat. 800 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5119 (2000 & Supp. 2004))).
2.
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat.
500 (amended by the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat.
2115 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a) (15) (A)-(B) (2000))).
3.
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a) (15) (A)-(B) (2000)).
4.
Howard M. Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382,
108 Stat. 4056 (amended by the Interethnic Adoptions Provisions of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104188, 110 Stat. 1755 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996(b), 5115a (2000))).
5.
Foster Care Independence Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-169, 113 Stat. 1822 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
6.
See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. §§ 1355.10-57, apps. A-F (2006) (regulations applicable to Title
lV-E of the Social Security Act); 45 C.F.R. §§ 1357.10-50 (2006) (regulations applicable to
Title IV-B of the Social Security Act). To help explain the new, complex child welfare regulations, the American Bar Association issued a guide in 2001 "making sense" of the
regulations. See generally DEBRA RArERMAN BAKER ET AL., MAKING SENSE OF THE ASFA
REGULATIONS-A ROADMAP FOR EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION (2001). Currently, the Children's Bureau, the federal agency responsible for working with State and local agencies to
develop and administer child welfare programs, has a budget of over $7 billion. ABOUT THE
CHILDREN'S BUREAU, http://vw.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/aboutcb/aboutcb.htm
(last
visited Sept. 4, 2007).
7.
42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b) (2) (A) (ix) (2000) (requiring appointing of "a guardian ad
litem who may be an attorney" for the child).
8.
The ASFA requires periodic review of a court case at least ever)' six months, as well
as a permanency planning hearing once every twelve months for as long as the child remains in foster care. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(B)-(C) (2000).
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abuse and neglect and has taken the lead in developing strategies
to improve the well-being of foster kids. At thisjuncture, few, if any,
question the federal government's role in these capacities.0
But have the lives of children over the last thirty years actually
improved on account of such federal involvement? That question
remains open, as child welfare conditions remain unacceptably
poor. The number of children in care has more than doubled over
the past twenty-five years and reports of suspected maltreatment
have skyrocketed. 0 Children continue to stay too long in care and
have too many placements." Social workers assigned to work with
families and attorneys representing parents and children are overwhelmed and rarely provide meaningful assistance. 2 State courts
9.
The overwhelming praise for the enactment of the ASFA, the last major federal
child welfare initiative, indicates the broad public support federal child welfare policy has
received. See, e.g.,Jeff Katz, Finally The Law Puts These Kids' Interests First, MILWAUKEEJ.SENTINEL, Dec. 28, 1997, at 1;John MacDonald, Two Examples Of Congress At Its Best, HARTFORD
COURANT, Nov. 22, 1997, at Al1; Bob Hohler, OpeningA Door To 'Stable, Loving'Homes; Clinton
Signs Law 7b Make Safety of Children Top Priority In Adoptions, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 20, 1997, at
A].
10.
"During Federal fiscal year (FFY) 2005, an estimated 3.3 million referrals, involving
the alleged maltreatment of approximately 6.0 million children, were made to [child protective services] agencies." CHILD. BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., CHILD
MALTREATMENT 2005 xiv (2007). Approximately thirty percent of the investigations determined that a child was a victim of child abuse and neglect. Id. at 5. Between 1990 and 2002,
the number of child maltreatment investigations increased by 21.3% despite a decrease in
the victimization rate by 7.5%. CHILD. BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
CHILD MALTREATMENT 2002 21 (2004). The number of foster children has also increased
over time. Over the past twenty-five years, the number of children in foster care has increased from roughly 262,000 to approximately 500,000. CHILD. BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., THE AFCARS REPORT: PRELIMINARY FY 2005 ESTIMATES AS OF
SEPTEMBER 2006 (2006), http://ww.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/statsresearch/afcars/tar/
reporl13.pdf.
11.
Twenty-five years ago, there were 262,000 children in foster care. OFF. ASSISTANT
SEC'Y FOR PLAN. & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., TRENDS IN THE
WELL-BEING
OF AMERICA'S
CHILDREN
AND
YOUTH
44-45 (1997),
available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/97trends/intro-web.htm. About forty-eight percent of children
spent two or more years in care and about twenty percent were in care for more than six
years. Statement on Signing H.R. 3434 into Law, 16 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1124 (June
17, 1980). Today, nearly half a million children are in foster care, fifty percent of whom
spend at least two years in care and twenty percent of whom spend five or more years there.
THE AFCARS REPORT, supranote 10.
12.
Social workers and attorneys handling child protective cases are overwhelmed. THE
ANNIE

E.

CASEY FOUNDATION, THE UNSOLVED CHALLENGE OF SYSTEM REFORM: THE CONDI-

TION OF THE FRONTLINE HUMAN SERVICE WORKFORCE 9 tbl.1 (2003), http://69.18.145.86/

upload/PublicationFiles/the%20unsolved%20challenge.pdf

(observing

that

the

annual

turnover rate in the child welfare workforce is twenty percent for public agencies and forty
percent for private agencies); David Herring, The Adoption and Safe Families Act-Hope and Its

Subversion, 34 FAM. L.Q. 329, 333-34 (2000) (describing child welfare systems to be "extremely resource poor, especially in urban areas. Public child welfare agency caseworkers

often carry ongoing caseloads in excess of thirty families each.... [T]he other actors in
these public systems are also extremely overburdened. Attorneys for each of the parties (i.e.
the public agency, the parents, and the children) often carry enormous caseloads or devote
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face pressures to move cases through a busy docket rather than
spend the time needed to make informed decisions about individual children.'3 Many child welfare systems are or have been subject
to court monitoring after evidence that the systems violated the
constitutional and statutory rights of families. 4 A recent audit conducted by the federal government found that the vast majority of
states were not in substantial conformity with federal requirements."5 In Michigan alone, over six thousand children whose
parents' rights have been terminated await adoptive families. 6 Until then, these legal orphans remain in state custody indefinitely
without any meaningful familial relationships. The question begs
to be repeated: Are foster children actually better off now than
they were thirty years ago, before major federal involvement in the
area of child welfare began?
Though advocates may answer this question differently, few, if
any, would disagree that much work needs to be done to improve
only a small portion of their time to child welfare cases."); Editorial, A Legal Handfor Foster
Children, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 28, 2005, at B18 ("[W]ith many of these lawyers burdened with
overwhelming student loans, poorly compensated posts and outrageous caseloads, many are
being forced out of these roles that foster children so desperately rely on.").
13.
Herring, supra note 12, at 334 ("Judges also handle very large caseloads within the
child welfare system. In some urban systems, each judge will dispose of forty to eighty cases
within an eight hour day.").
14.
Children's Rights Inc., a non-profit legal organization based in New York City has
litigated numerous class action cases which have resulted in court oversight over state
child welfare systems. See Children's Rights, Cases, https://secure2.convio.net/cr/site/
SPageServer?pagename=cases (last visited Sept. 4, 2007) (listing ongoing and completed
cases handled by Children's Rights Inc.). This list only represents a partial summary of successful systemic actions brought against dysfunctional child welfare systems. See, e.g., CHILD
WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA & ABA CENTER ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, CHILD WELFARE
CONSENT DECREES: ANALYSIS OF THIRTY-FIVE COURT ACTIONS FROM 1995 TO 2005 2 (2005),

http://www.cwla.org/advocacy/consentdecrees.pdf (finding that twenty-one states were
either currently under a court approved consent decree or court order or had pending
litigation brought against their child welfare agency).
15.
Federal audits of the foster care system conducted in 2001 and 2002 found that the
majority of states were "not in substantial conformity" with federal child welfare laws. Ben
Kerman, What is the Child and Family Service Review?, VOICE, Fall 2003, at 34, 35, http://
%vqw.caseyfamilyserices.org/pdfs/casey-voice-iv_2.pdf. One-third of the states did not have
an adequate case review system as required by federal law. Id. "[O]nly five states met the
criteria for protecting children from abuse and neglect. None of the states reviewed satisfied
the outcome of providing children with permanency and stability in their living situations."
Id. Ultimately, not one state passed the audit.
16.
As of March, 2004, approximately 6200 foster children in state custody had their
parents' rights terminated but were still waiting to be adopted. MICH. DEP'T OF HUM.
SERVS.,
FACT
SHEET
(2004),
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/FIA-AdoptionFactSheet_87050_7.pdf. This "orphaning" of foster children has met significant criticism.
See, e.g., Deborah Paruch, The Orphaningof Underprivileged Children: America's Failed Child Welfare Law & Policy, 8J.L. & FAM. STUD. 119 (2006); Kenneth L. Tacoma, Lost andAlone on Some
Forgotten Highway: ASFA, Binsfield, and the Law of Unintended Consequences, 10 MICH. CHILD
WELFARE L.J. 37 (2007), availableat http://www.michbar.org/childrens/pdfs/spring7.pdf.
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our policies to better address the needs of families affected by the
child welfare system. A robust, creative, and energizing debate
must occur that re-examines current child welfare policies and
charts out future paths for reform.'7 All options need to be on the
table. How much time should the State afford a neglectful or abusive parent to prove her ability to care for her child? Does a policy
mandating the reporting of child abuse and neglect further interests in protecting children or does it create an unnecessarily
adversarial relationship between parents and the State and also
overwhelm child protective agencies? How should scarce public
funds be spent? Should relatives be given a subsidy if they obtain
guardianship of children to prevent them from entering the foster
care system? Should attorneys be appointed for parents and children priorto court intervention in order to explore options other
than foster care for these families? What supports should adoptive
parents receive to prevent adopted children with serious needs
from returning to the foster care system? An endless list of questions emerges to guide the rigorous discourse about the future of
the child welfare system.
Where should such a discussion occur? Traditionally, states have
been the forum for policy debates involving family law. 8 Not only
do principles of constitutional federalism strictly limit the federal
government's authority to directly legislate on these issues, but as a
matter of policy, most would agree that the federal government is
ill-suited to mandate specific prescriptions on family law.'9 As one
legal scholar accurately observed:
17.
The need for creativity and flexibility was acknowledged by the Administration of
Children and Families. In a policy statement issued on May 23, 2002, it stated, "Child welfare
systems throughout the country continue to face many complex and difficult challenges.
New, creative and innovative efforts are needed to stimulate meaningful change in child
welfare service delivery and to promote improved outcomes for children and families."
CHILD. BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., INFORMATION MEMORANDUM ON
TITLE IV-E CHILD WELFARE DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS REQUESTS FOR EXTENSIONSPROCEDURES AND

CRITERIA (2002), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/laws-policies/

policy/im/2002/im0206.pdf.
18.
See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (observing, in both the majority and the dissent, that family law constituted a clearly defined realm of exclusive state

authority); Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1821 (1995)
("From the earliest days of the Republic until the recent past, family law has unquestionably
belonged to the states."). But seeJill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45
UCLA L. REv. 1297, 1299-1300 (1998) (stating that the federal government played a dominant role in family law during the period of Reconstruction, but arguing against the
contention that history demonstrates the exclusive localism of family law).
19.
In his dissent in Santosky v. Kramer,455 U.S. 745, 770 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), Justice Rehnquist observed that "few of us would care to live in a society where every
aspect of life was regulated by a single source of law," id., and that "it is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve
as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
HeinOnline -- 41 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 285 2007-2008
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[T] he communitarian nature of family law requires a level of
political engagement and a sense of community identity that
lie beyond the reach of national politics. As the quality of political deliberation falls and as the bonds of community thin
out, the danger that shared values will degenerate into governmentally dictated values increases.
By situating
communitarian politics at the state level, therefore, localism
ensures that the civic participation, political dialogue, and
shared values essential to family law will develop within the
states' smaller, relatively more accessible political locales. °
Consistent with this view, substantive debates about contentious
family law issues occur primarily on the state level. Issues such as
gay marriage and adoption, the merits of a joint custody presumption, or the legal grounds for divorce, are left to state legislatures
to decide. Divergent approaches allow states to generate information about best practices and present citizens across the country
with a spectrum of options from which to choose a system that accords with their moral and philosophical beliefs. As another
scholar noted:
Legal decision-makers confront fundamental questions concerning the meaning of parenthood, the best custodial
placements for children, the rights and obligations of marriage, the financial terms of divorce and the standards
governing foster care and adoption. In answering such questions, state legislatures and courts draw upon community
values and norms on the meaning of the good life for families
and children.'
Regardless of significant policy differences throughout the states
on family law issues, no one has proposed that the federal government nationalize family law and usurp the states' authority to make

country." Id. at 773 (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)). Similar arguments have also been made by academics and policymakers. See, e.g., Dailey, supra note 18, at 1791, 1871 ("States ... are far better situated than
the national government to develop and sustain a normative political discourse on family

life.... As the quality of political deliberation falls and as the bonds of community thin out,
the danger that shared values will degenerate into governmentally dictated values in-

creases."). Today, few argue that establishing a national family law policy would produce
desirable results.

20.

Dailey, supra note 18, at 1871-72.

21.

Id. at 1790.
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these policyjudgments on general family law matters. Accordingly,
family law issues are primarily handled at the state level.
However, child welfare policy in particular, which today is driven
by federal law, represents a notable exception to this pattern of
state control on family law matters. Over the past thirty years, the
federal government's involvement in managing state child welfare
systems has increased dramatically, primarily through a series of
funding statutes designed to conform state systems to a federal
model of what is best for children.5 Although considerable debate
exists about the validity of the federal model, 4 debate on this issue
at the state level is stifled. By conditioning states' receipt of federal
funding on a detailed set of statutes and regulations mandating
how each individual case must proceed, states, which desperately
need funding, have very little flexibility to innovate. States looking
to receive federal funding are given financial incentives to implement a one-size-fits-all model which places poor children in foster
care, terminates parental rights expeditiously and locates adoptive
homes immediately. Any State wishing to deviate from federal
mandates risks losing millions of dollars. 5
While limiting innovation at the state policy level, federal micromanagement of child welfare policy has also pushed juvenile
court proceedings in a direction inconsistent with the individualized needs of children. Faced with the daunting task of complying
with a detailed and complex set of federal statutes, state court
judges use what limited time they have on cases ensuring compliance with federal policies. Thus, court hearings are often
transformed into perfunctory exercises designed to guarantee that
the correct box on a pre-printed form is checked. Courts have also
22.
See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992) (quoting ex parte Burrus,
136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890)) ("[T]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband
and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the
United States."); Dailey, supra note 18, at 1789 ("[F]amily law constitutes a clearly defined
realm of exclusive state authority.").
23.
For a more detailed discussion on federal funding of the child welfare system, see
Miriam Rollin et al., Federal Child Welfare Law and Policy: Understandingthe Federal Law and
Funding Process, in CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE: REPRESENTING CHILDREN, PARENTS
AND

STATE AGENCIES IN ABUSE,

NEGLECT AND DEPENDENCY CASES

143-183 (Donald N.

Duquette & Marvin Ventrell eds., 2005).
24.
See, e.g., Martin Guggenheim, Commentary: The Foster Care Dilemma and What b Do
About It: Is the Problem that too Many Children Are Not Being Adopted Out of Foster Care or that too
Many Children Are EnteringFoster Care?, 2 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 141 (1999) (criticizing the Adop-

tion and Safe Families Act); Gary B. Melton, Mandated Reporting: A Policy Without Reason, 29
CHILD ABUSE &

NEGLECT

9, 14 (2005) (questioning the benefits of mandatory reporting

laws driven by federal requirements).
25.
See infra text accompanying notes 28-57 (discussing a series of federal child welfare
statutes that condition the receipt of federal dollars on state compliance with specific mandates).
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abandoned their sacrosanct role of preventing overreaching and
poor decision-making by child welfare agencies, afraid that doing
so will reduce federal funding. Achieving outcomes that are best
for an individual child is a secondary concern. Instead, the juvenile
court judge's priority is to issue orders that will enable the State to
maximize the amount of child welfare assistance it receives from
the federal government. Creative, case-specific solutions to the
problems confronting the family are the exception, not the norm.21
This Article will explore the unintended consequences of federal involvement in child welfare policy and will argue that federal
involvement in dictating the substance of state laws must be minimized to spark the vigorous debate and innovation needed to
reform the child welfare system. Part I will briefly explore the significant growth in federal laws affecting the foster care system over
the past thirty years. Part II will discuss the unintended consequences of this growth, primarily its impact on stifling innovative
approaches and rigorous debate in the area. Finally, Part III will
propose that the federal government's role in child protection issues should be limited to four areas: 1) supporting, not
supplanting, the states' responsibility to design systems to meet the
needs of their families; 2) ensuring that states protect the constitutional rights of parents and children; 3) resolving interstate issues
affecting children that cannot be adequately addressed by individual states; and 4) providing research and technical assistance to
states as they design their policies.
I.

EXPANSION OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S ROLE
IN CHILD WELFARE

Consistent with the traditional view that the responsibility to
confront family law issues rested with state governments, prior to
the early 1970s, the federal government assumed a very limited
role in child welfare issues. 7 In 1974, awakened to issues involving
child abuse and neglect by Dr. Henry Kempe's landmark article,
The Battered Child Syndrome, and concerned about the inadequacies

in state child protection and foster care systems, Congress passed
the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act ("CAPTA"), the
26.
See infra text accompanying notes 105-116 (discussing ways in which federal child
welfare statutes have limited the options available to state court judges to resolve child protection cases).
27.
See Marvin Ventrell, The Histoy of Child Welfare Law, in CHILD WELFARE LAW AND

PRACTICE, supra note 23, at 113, 136-38 (describing the evolution of the federal government's role in child protection issues).
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first in a series of bills in which Congress, exercising its constitutional authority pursuant to the Spending Clause, sought to reform
state systems through incentive-based funding." In exchange for
receiving funding to support their child welfare systems, states had
to agree to federal mandates. Congress, in 1980, followed with the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act ("AACWA") and seventeen years later, amended AACWA in the Adoption and Safe
Families Act ("ASFA")."9

Each of these laws passed with overwhelming bipartisan support. 0 During congressional debates, however, legislators went to
great lengths to allay concerns that federal involvement would divest states of the authority to make policy judgments regarding how
to meet the needs of foster children.1 Repeatedly, legislators and
executive officials acknowledged that state governments were best
32
suited to craft unique policies for children in their jurisdictions.
28.
Id.
29.
See supra notes 2-3.
Rollin et al., supra note 23, at 144 ("One crucial element of the history of federal
30.
child welfare policy making is that the protection of children who are at risk of abuse or
neglect, and of children who have been abused or neglected, has been overwhelmingly
bipartisan.").
Those opposing increased federal involvement in child welfare policy primarily
31.
have focused on federalism concerns. For example, during the CAPTA debate, the Nixon
administration believed that "local community efforts should be encouraged and supported
rather than supplanted by Federal mandates" and that the CAPTA was counterproductive by
"mandating specific procedures" on state governments. 119 CONG. Rac. 23,906-07 (1973).
Senator Helms stated that the CAPTA represented "another step in the direction of centralizing further power and responsibility in Washington" and that "[c]hild abuse... is a crime
that States and local governments have as their responsibility." 119 CONG. REc. 23,907
(1973). Senator Thurmond argued that "the protection of children is primarily a state responsibility" that "should not be controlled by a Federal bureaucracy." 119 CONG. REC.
23,908 (1973).
Similar concerns manifested themselves during the debate over the ASFA. Representative
Mink argued that child welfare policy "should be left to the States" and that "[a] Congress
that has repeatedly argued States rights should not abandon that principle." 143 CONG. REC.
H2,023 (1997). Representative Paul asserted that "[the] constitutionally mandated separation of powers strictly limited the role of the Federal Government and, at the same time,
anticipated that matters of family law would be dealt with at the State or local level." 143
CONG. REc. H2,024 (1997). These opinions represented the beliefs of a small minority of
legislators.
Supporters of federal child welfare policy argued that increased federal involve32.
ment was intended to support state efforts to combat child abuse and neglect. For example,
Senator Mondale, a primary sponsor of the CAPTA stated that "[tihe purpose of the 'Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act' is to provide support to successful and promising
efforts to deal with child abuse." 119 CONG. Rc. 23,903 (1973). Representative Schroeder
clarified that the purpose of the Act was simply to "spur the States to strengthen and expand
their own programs." 119 CONG.. REc. 39,231 (1973). During the AACWA debates, the
House Committee on Ways and Means, in which the legislation originated, stated that the
legislation was not intended "to place a new and onerous burden on the States" and that the
purpose was to complement and allow for expansion of State efforts. H.R. REP. No. 96-136,
at 37 (1979). Senator Moynihan echoed these sentiments, believing that the CAPTA "does
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For example, during the debate on the CAPTA, Senator Javitts,
who supported the legislation, recognized that "the Federal Gov-3
ernment will serve basically an innovative and catalytic function.0
Senator Dominick remarked:
This legislation is not intended to establish a permanent Federal program, but to enlarge public and professional
awareness, and to stimulate the development of State and private programs which will both reduce the incidence of child
abuse and provide treatment to its victims.
After the planning and implementation of State Programs has
begun to crystallize, the role of the Federal Government in
this area can be reduced if not eliminated.34
In the House of Representatives, Representative Eshelman,
who also voted for the legislation, observed that "a solution to
these problems cannot and will not be found strictly through
the Federal Government intervention. This is primarily a State
and local matter. '31 Similar statements were made during debates of the AACWA and ASFA, together evincing a legislative
intent to limit the role of the federal government in managing
state child welfare policy.
In reality, however, a different relationship between the states
and the federal government has emerged. Cash-starved states
desperate to receive funding for child protective systems have
abdicated their authority to develop their own child welfare
policies and instead have yielded to increasingly specific mandates made by the federal government on issues of much
normative and substantive disagreement, such as when to terminate parental rights and what types of efforts should be made to
reunify families.3 6 To date, no state has rejected federal fundnot expect more of the States ...than is reasonable to expect of them" nor does it "burden
them with excessive regulations." 125 CONG. REC. 29,504 (1979). Similarly, Representative
Rangel's statements during the ASFA debates typified the views of many legislators. "We do
not have all of the answers here in Washington.... But one thing is clear, that the facts and
circumstances surrounding the condition and the welfare of that child is closer to the State
than it is Washington, DC." 143 CONG. REc. H2,016 (1997).
33.
119 CONG. REc. 23,896 (1973).
34.
Id. at 23,907.
35.
Id. at 39,228.
36.
"Federal funds account for approximately half of states' total reported spending
for child welfare services."

KASIA O'NEILL MURRAY, THE CHILD WELFARE FINANCING STRUC-

(2002), http://pewfostercare.org/research/docs/MurrayPaper2.pdf;
STEVE
CHRISTIAN & NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGIS., THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF FEDERAL CHILD
WELFARE FINANCING: A PRIMER FOR POLICYMAKERS 1 (2006), http://www.ncsl.org/print/
TURE

1
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ing. 37 To receive funding, these states must demonstrate that their
system matches a host of federal requirements which have become
increasingly restrictive over the years. For example, the CAPTA,
which was reauthorized in 2003, conditions states' receipt of federal funds, in part, on the establishment of a comprehensive
program for 1) mandated reporting of suspected child maltreatment;" 2) responding to those reports with assessment methods
that assess the validity of the reports; 9 3) taking action appropriate
to the level of risk of harm; 40 and 4) requiring the appointment of
a guardian ad litem to represent the best interests of the child. 41 To

avail themselves of federal funding under the statute, states must
reapply every five years and submit a plan that complies with the
CAPTA's requirements. Funds under the CAPTA can be used to
support efforts aimed at preventing 4maltreatment
and responding
2
to reports of child abuse and neglect.
The AACWA, the ASFA, and detailed regulations issued in 2000
to clarify the scope of these and other federal child welfare statutes
impose additional requirements on states looking to receive federal funds. In exchange for federal funding, states must comply
with an exhaustive list of requirements. They include, but are not
limited to the following: making judicial findings at the first court
hearing that leaving the child in her home is contrary to her welfare;4 3 making a judicial finding within sixty days of the child's
removal that reasonable efforts were made to prevent the removal
of the child from her home 44 (but waiving that requirement when
aggravated circumstances are present) ;45 developing a detailed case
plan within sixty days of removal; 46 initiating an effort to terminate
cyf/CWFinancing.pdf. For example, 75% of the funds used to support children in foster
care in New Mexico derive from federal coffers. JUDICIAL EDUC. CTR., CHILD WELFARE
HANDBOOK ch. 38.1, available at http://jec.unm.edu/resources/benchbooks/child-]aw/
ch_38.htm. According to the Urban Institute's latest child welfare financing survey, states
spent 11.7 billion dollars in federal funds on child welfare programs. CYNTHIA ANDREWS
SCARCELLA
STATE

ET AL., THE

VARIATION

IN

Cost OF
CHILD

PROTECTING VULNERABLE CHILDREN
WELFARE

FINANCING

7

(2006),

V: UNDERSTANDING

http://www.urban.org/

UploadedPDF/31 1314_vulnerable children.pdf.
37.
Herring, supra note 12, at 331 n.13 ("Although the states are free to refuse federal
funds, no state has exercised this option, and in fact, every state actively seeks and desperately needs federal funds in order to operate their child welfare systems.").
38.
42 U.S.C. § 5106(a) (2000).
39.
Id.
40.
Id.
41.
§ 5106a(b) (2) (A) (xiii).
42.
Rollin et al., supra note 23, at 149.
43.
45 C.F.R. § 1356.21 (c) (2006).
44.
§ 1356.21 (b) (I) (i).
45.
42 U.S.C. § 671 (a) (15)(D); 45 C.F.R. 1356.21 (b) (3).
46.
45 C.F.R. § 1356.21 (g) (2).
HeinOnline -- 41 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 291 2007-2008

University of MichiganJournalof Law Reform

[VOL. 41:1

parental rights within sixty days of removal in certain enumerated
circumstances;47 holding a permanency planning hearing every
twelve months;" seeking termination of parental rights when a
child has been in foster care for fifteen of the most recent twentytwo months unless specific exceptions apply;4 9 maintaining the responsibility for the child's placement and care in a public child
welfare agency as opposed to a court;50 mandating specific licensing requirements for foster parents and barring certain individuals
from becoming foster parents;5' and providing foster parents and
other caregivers notice and an opportunity to be heard at any hearing on the child. 2 Failure to comply with any one of these and
could jeopardize the states' receipt of federal
other mandates
53
funding.

States complying with the AACWA and the ASFA can receive
matching federal funds under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act,
which can be used for maintaining and administering the foster
care system, adoption subsidies, and training.5' This pool of funds
is by far the largest source of federal funding available to states for
child welfare programs, and thus, states are particularly sensitive to
ensuring compliance with these provisions. Additionally, the statutes provide states with financial incentives to move children into
adoptive homes by establishing a baseline of adoptions and awarding states a bonus for each adoption from foster care in excess of
that baseline.5 5 Compliance with these federal provisions is monitored through child and family service reviews which assess state
performance based on various indicators.56 State systems that fail
this test are given a limited opportunity to57 implement an improvement plan before losing federal funding.
The discussion above is not intended to paint a comprehensive
picture of the federal government's involvement in child welfare

§ 1356.21 (i) (1)
(ii)-(iii).
47.
42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C).
48.
45 C.F.R. § 1356.21 (i)(1) (i).
49.
42 U.S.C. § 672(a) (2).
50.
51.
45 C.F.R. § 1356.30.
52.
§ 1356.21(o).
53.
42 U.S.C. § 674(d).
54.
See MURRAY, supra note 36, at 3. Federal reimbursement under Title IV-E is provided for 1) maintenance payments to foster families, covering the costs of shelter, food, and
clothing; 2) placement and administrative costs of children in foster care, including case
management, eligibility determination, licensing, and court preparation; and 3) training for
staff and adoptive parents. Id.
55.
42 U.S.C. § 673b.
56.
45 C.F.R. § 1355.33.
57.
§ 1355.35.
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issues, as many others have already undertaken that task.58 The
brief analysis simply illustrates the tremendous role that the federal
government has played and continues to play in managing state
child welfare systems. No doubt, federal involvement has generated
a lot of positive change for vulnerable families. Key aspects of today's child protective system that many would agree has benefited
families, such as appointing guardians ad litem for children, providing foster care and adoption subsidies to caregivers, and
convening timely court hearings to address the interests of the
children have been sparked by federal laws. In addition, millions of
federal dollars flow into state systems annually and the federal government conducts and disseminates timely research on child abuse
and neglect through the National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse
and Neglect, which was established in the CAPTA.59 Again, federal
involvement has played and continues to play an important and
beneficial role in this area. Nevertheless, such expansive federal
intervention has resulted in several unintended and negative consequences, many of which have yet to be explored. In what ways
has federal involvement stifled reform efforts and creativity in the
states? Has it hampered a family court judge's ability to craft creative, case-specific solutions that suit the needs of individual
families? Is there a way that federal policy can be redesigned to address the needs of foster children while still encouraging
innovation? The next two sections confront these and other questions.

II.

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT

While federal involvement in child welfare has produced positive changes in a number of ways, it has stifled innovation in the
states in two primary ways. First, by conditioning receipt of desperately needed federal funds on compliance with specific mandates
and by restricting the expenditure of funds to certain programs,
the federal government has imposed its normative judgments on
states about what is best for children and removed the ability of
states to deviate from these policies. Second, state court judges,
cognizant that their decisions may jeopardize federal funding,
spend their limited time during court hearings carefully crafting
orders, using designated words and phrases drawn from federal

58.
For a more comprehensive discussion of federal child welfare policy, see generally
Rollin et al., supra note 23.
59.
42 U.S.C. § 5104.
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statutes such as "reasonable efforts" and "contrary to the welfare of
the child, '' c all in an effort to ensure that federal mandates have
not been violated-as opposed to focusing on the individual needs
of the children before them.
As illustrated in the previous Section, across the country, the
dominant policy concern of state child welfare agencies is to ensure that they maximize federal funding. Annually, the federal
government provides billions of dollars of assistance to states to be
allocated to their child protective systems, 62 and states rely upon
this funding to operate these child welfare systems. Without federal
funding, any progress made over the past thirty years would crumble.
Yet, states pay a price for accepting such funds. They must conform their systems to federal mandates and yield their discretion to
the federal government in making certain policy judgments about
families. Two issues are illustrative of this point: mandatory reporting laws and termination of parental rights. In the CAPTA, the
federal government conditioned receipt of federal funds on states
by establishing a comprehensive program for mandated reporting
and investigation of suspected child maltreatment. 63 Currently,
every State has established such a program, and each year, child
protective services receives millions of reports of child maltreatment, of which less than a quarter are eventually substantiated as
evidence of child abuse or neglect.6 Though state requirements
vary on who must report suspected maltreatment, state systems
generally share a similar investigative scheme. Individuals are either required to or can voluntarily call child protective services to
report abuse or neglect, a protective services worker is sent to the
house to investigate, and he or she makes a finding of whether the
allegation should be substantiated or not.65 Based on this finding,
the worker then makes both a risk and safety assessment of the
60.
The terms "reasonable efforts" and "contrary to the welfare of the child" are used
throughout federal child welfare statutes. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 671. Pursuant to federal laws,
findings, specifically using this language, must be made by juvenile courts in order to preserve eligibility for federal child welfare funding. See Rollin et a., supranote 23, at 152-57.
61.
See infra text accompanying notes 105-116 (discussing ways in which federal child
welfare statutes have limited the options available to state court judges to resolve child protection cases).
62.
SCARCELLA ET AL., supra note 36, at 7 (stating that the federal government provides
state child welfare systems with over eleven billion dollars in financial assistance each year).

63.

42 U.S.C. § 5106a.

64.

See CHILD MALTREATMENT 2005, supra note 10, at 5 (noting that 62% of reports

were investigated and that 28.5% of those investigations determined that the child was
abused or neglected).

65.

See Sue Badeau et al., A Child'sJourney Through The Child Welfare System, in CHILD

WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE,supranote 23, at 213, 219-220.
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children in the home, also required by federal law, and makes a
further decision on whether the children should be immediately
removed from the home or whether court involvement is necessary.6 This standard system of investigation, which is utilized across
the states, focuses exclusively on whether abuse or neglect has occurred and establishes an adversarial relationship between the
State and the parent at the outset of the relationship. 67 Furthermore, because the largest federal grant to states for child welfare
involves reimbursing costs associated with housing children in foster care as opposed to preventive services, states have a strong
financial incentive to place children in foster care after the completion of this investigative process, as opposed to working with
families on a voluntary basis while children remain in their
homes.6s
Yet, while mandatory reporting is the law throughout the United
States, it is not universal across the world. In countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany, professionals are not
required to report abuse or neglect. 9 Those jurisdictions have rejected the process on several grounds, including that it is
unnecessary, encourages professionals to diminish their own responsibility to address the problem, and wastes resources that
could be better spent on other assistance programs. 70 These nations
66.
Id. at 220-22.
67.
Id. at 219-23.
See, e.g.,Judith R. Tackett, Federal Policy Hampers Foster Care,NASHVILLE CITY PAPER,
68.
June 17, 2004, available at http://www.nashvillecitypaper.com/news.php?viewStory=33858
("The federal government gives monetary incentives for states to place children who are in
their custody into the foster care system, cutting funding if kids are placed in permanent
homes."). Not surprisingly, the Pew Commission on Children in Foster Care found that
"[c]urrent federal funding mechanisms for child welfare encourage an over-reliance on
foster care at the expense of other services" and "[b] ecause funding for safe alternatives for
foster care is so limited, states use placement in foster care more than they might otherwise."
PEW COMM'N

ON CHILD.

IN FOSTER CARE, FOSTERING THE FUTURE:

SAFETY, PERMANENCE

AND WELL-BEING FOR CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE 13, 20 (2004), http://pewfostercare.org/
research/docs/FinalReport.pdf [hereinafter FOSTERING THE FUTURE].
See Neil Gilbert, Introduction to COMBATTING CHILD ABUSE: INTERNATIONAL PER69.
SPECTIVES AND TRENDS 3, 5 (Neil Gilbert ed., 1997).

70.
See Catherine Marneffe & Patrick Bross, Belgium: An Alternative Approach to Child
Abuse Reporting and 7reatment, in COMBATTING CHILD ABUSE, supra note 69, at 167, 170, 177
(citations onitted) (observing that mandatory reporting requirements "make it difficult for
health professionals to help and for the abusive parents to ask for help." In Belgium,
"[c]omprehension and compassion, the offer of noncoercive services and support by one
agency for those who fail in the familial relationships, are put forward instead of scandal,

reporting, and the obligation to visit a specific agency for those who are labeled child abusers."); Marian A. S. Roelofs & Herman E. M. Baartman, The Netherlands: Responding to AbuseCompassion or Control, in COMBATTING CHILD ABUSE, supra note 69, at 192, 199 ("[T]here is
the practical fear that a system of mandatory reporting would inhibit abusing parents from
voluntarily coming forth to seek help."); Reinhart Wolff, Germany, A Nonpunitive Model in
COMBATTING CHILD ABUSE, supra note 69, at 212, 215 (describing German child protection
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have instead opted for family-centered, preventive approaches,
such as home health visitors and parent education as their primary
means of addressing the issue. 71
In addition to criticism from abroad, many in this country have
also decried the process of federally-mandated reporting. Observing that most allegations of abuse are unsubstantiated, and that the
vast majority of allegations consist of cases that involve neither serious harm nor immediate physical injury to the child, some have
concluded that "l[t] he current flood of unfounded reports is over7
whelming the limited resources of child protection agencies. 1
Others have gone farther. Gary Melton, a professor at Clemson
University, writes,
[T]here is no logical relationship between the problems presented and the response undertaken. The United States and
other societies that have adopted the central tenets of U.S.
child protection policy have an enormously successful calamitous system that has neither a realistic scientific foundation
nor well articulated normative underpinnings.73
Even the U.S. Advisory Board on Child Abuse and Neglect recognizes the problems associated with relying too heavily on
reporting and response mechanisms. The report issued by the
Board made the following observations:
The most serious shortcoming of the nation's system of intervention on behalf of children is that it depends upon a
reporting and response process that has punitive connotations and requires massive resources dedicated to the
investigation of allegations.4
model as one emphasizing "client friendliness, advocacy, and community participation.
From this perspective, there is no place for mandatory reporting or central registers, which
elsewhere have led to crisis and disaster, as more and more people have begun to realize.").
71.
See, e.g., Marneffe & Bross, supra note 70, at 170 (describing creation of specialized
centers in Belgium for the prevention and treatment of child abuse and neglect. At these
centers, the emphasis is on treatment and not on investigation); Wolff, supra note 70, at
215-16 ("German child protection relies mainly on a full-fledged system of services ranging
from low-cost day care to free counseling, from infant health care and social assistance
(which guarantee a life above the poverty line), to family services and family aides (homemakers), plus a special network of accessible, regionalized services like the multidisciplinary
Child Protection Centers.").
72.
Douglas Besharov, Contending With Overblown Expectations: CPS Cannot Be All Things
ToAllPeople, 45 PUB. WELFARE 7, 7-12 (1987).

73.
74.

Melton, supra note 24, at 12.
U.S. ADvISORY BD. ON CHILD

ABUSE

&

NEGLECT, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT:

CRITICAL FIRST STEPS IN RESPONSE TO A NATIONAL EMERGENCY 80 (1990).
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The result of the current design of the child protection system
is that investigation often seems to occur for its own sake,
without any realistic hope of meaningful treatment to prevent
75
the recurrence of maltreatment or to ameliorate its effects.

To those who oppose the requirement, mandatory reporting distracts professionals from addressing the underlying problems
affecting the family. Instead, such a requirement shifts the focus of
the child welfare system to legal definitions, rules for gathering
evidence, and standards for coercive intervention.
The purpose of this discussion is not to resolve the debate about
whether such a requirement should be a facet of our child protective system. A resolution of this contentious issue is well beyond the
scope of this Article. The conversation, however, must occur
throughout the states as they evaluate whether their approach is
the most effective method to address maltreatment. For example,
perhaps a non-adversarial system, as seen in many European countries utilizing parenting aides and home health visitors, would
engender trust between parents needing support and state agencies, and would encourage parents to voluntarily seek assistance. 7
Maybe even a model where other professionals, such as doctors,
teachers, and therapists, assume a more active role in working with
parents in need of help, as opposed to assigning that responsibility
solely to a child protective services worker, would better address
families' needs and encourage the community to help vulnerable
families. A system that saves money currently being depleted by
vast investigation machinery could fund innovative projects like
multidisciplinary teams that could better assess the needs of parents and children and prevent unnecessary removals. Ultimately, a
framework in which different states design systems attuned to the
needs and beliefs of their population would produce data upon
which others could rely to make informed judgments.

75.

U.S. ADviSORY BD. ON CHILD
A NEW NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR

NEIGHBORS:

ABUSE

&

NEGLECT,

NEIGHBORS

THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN

HELPING

10-11 (1993).

76.
Melton, supra note 24, at 13-14 (observing that mandatory report diverts CPS' attention "from the task of increasing the safety of children. It is largely engaged instead, as a
matter of legal obligation, in evidence gathering and preparation of actual or potential
court cases." In short, attention is focused on the question of" 'What happened?', not 'What
can we do to help?' . . . Vast human and fiscal resources that could be spent in prevention or
treatment are instead expended in investigations that usually result in significant disruption
of family life but little if any benefit.").
77.
Mandatory reporting policies may deter families from seeking help and increase
distrust among neighbors. Id. at 14-15. Melton suggests that "[g]overnments ought to facilitate the development of community environments that by their nature provide family
support and that ensure watchfulness for children." Id. at 16.
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Yet, these crucial conversations are not taking place at the state
level due to federal requirements that mandate a specific model,
emphasizing reporting, investigation, and court involvement,
which each state must either comply with or risk losing federal
funding. Regardless of doubts over the effectiveness of this model,
dissent is silenced and innovation is stifled because states no longer
possess the flexibility to propose creative alternatives to the federal
government's mandates.
Another difficult issue confronting policy-makers involves determining how much time to afford parents to demonstrate their
fitness prior to terminating their parental rights to a child. Some
argue that a child's need for permanency is paramount, and that
parents should only be given a short period of time, if any at all, to
prove their fitness as parents before alternate options such as
adoption can be pursued.78 In the State of Michigan, for example,
most parents are given twelve months to prove that they have addressed the underlying reasons for the child's entry into the foster
care system. If they fail to make the required showing, termination
proceedings are initiated against them. 9 Other situations warrant
immediate petitions to terminate parental rights.0
Critics contend that the complex needs of families affected by
the child protective system, such as poverty, substance abuse, and
mental illness demand a flexible approach, and that the termination of parental rights should only be used infrequently as a
remedy to resolve child protection cases. For example, Justice
Springer of the Nevada Supreme Court writes:
I understand the current "permanency" fad and the perceived
need to place children in more 'stable' homes; but this, in my
view, does not necessitate permanent severance of natural parental ties, except in the direst of cases. I do not see why
terminating this child's heritage ... from his life can be said

to be in his "best interests," especially when there is no evidence that by keeping the natural parental ties intact he

78.

Elizabeth Bartholet, for example, contends that a pervasive "blood bias" in the

child welfaie system sacrifices children's interests. ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY'S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE 7 (1999). She
alleges that the State is overly deferential to parents' rights and far too unwilling to remove
children from homes where they have been abused or neglected. Id.
79.
MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 712A.19a(5)-(6) (West 2007).

80.

§ 722.638(2).
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would lose the "permanency" and stability that he apparently
enjoys in foster placement.'
of
In addition, most European countries rarely terminate the rights
2
parents and instead pursue other less extreme alternatives.
The debate on this issue among academics and others continues. Yet, among state policy-makers, the debate is again silenced as
a direct consequence of federal laws that have supplanted the ability of individual states to make their own judgments on these
normative issues. For instance, the ASFA mandates that states file
petitions to terminate parental rights if children have been in foster care for fifteen out of twenty-two months absent exceptional
circumstances. 3 The Act also requires states to file immediate termination petitions in specific situations that are detailed in the
814
statute, and provides a financial bonus for states to finalize the
adoption of children. States cannot receive the bonus until the
rights of a biological parent have been terminated 5 Although federal laws permit states to terminate parental rights under a more
expedited timeframe than the one set forth under the ASFA, s6
states cannot extend that time limit. For example, a state that
passes a law giving parents two years to prove their fitness prior to
initiating termination of parental rights would run afoul of federal
mandates and would be in serious danger of losing precious federal dollars. Not surprisingly, every state has adopted the federal
policy favoring an expedited timeframe and promoting the termination of parental rights and adoption. 7 That every state accepts
federal requirements in this area does not necessarily suggest that
they agree with such requirements; rather, state compliance reflects a reality that states are willing to cede decision-making
authority to receive federal funds.88
81. In re Parental Rights of Bow, 930 P.2d 1128, 1136 & n.1 (Nev. 1997) (Springer,J,
dissenting), overruled by In re Parental Rights of NJ., 8 P.3d 126, 131-32 &n.4 (Nev. 2000).
82.

Laurie P. Cohen, ParentalRights-A Law's Fallout: Women in Prison Fightfor Custody,

ST. J., Feb. 27, 2006, at Al (observing that termination of parental rights in European
countries is rare).
83. 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21 (i) (2006).
WALL

84.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 673b (2000).
85.
86.
§ 678 (permitting State to take any action "to protect the health and safety of children in individual cases").
87.
See Herring, supra note 12, at 331 n.13 (observing that every State has accepted
federal foster care funding, which, in turn, mandates following federal requirements).
88.
Concerns over the expedited termination of parental rights illustrate this point.
For example, recently the State of California enacted legislation permitting courts to reinstate parental rights after termination when in a child's best interest. The law resulted out of
a concern that the State had terminated the legal rights of both parents to over six thousand
children, many of whom would never be adopted. Realizing that many of these children
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Federal laws control state policy-making, not only by conditioning receipt of funding on following specific requirements, but also
by limiting the expenditure of federal funds to certain purposes.
The vast majority of federal funding can only be accessed by states
once children from poor homes have been removed and placed in
foster care.8 9 These funds, distributed under Tide IV-E of the Social
Security Act, constitute forty-eight percent of all federal child welfare spending in 2000.90 The program is a permanently authorized,
open-ended entitlement and can only be spent on costs associated
with placements of children in licensed foster homes and on subsidies for adoptive parents.9' In contrast, funds under Title IV-B of
the Act, used primarily for prevention, family preservation, and
reunification efforts, comprise only five percent of the spending
and are a capped entidement subject to reauthorization by Congress on a regular basis.92
The perverse incentives are clear. States that develop effective
programs diverting children from foster care receive minimal federal assistance, whereas those that place children in foster care
indefinitely obtain maximum aid. Once a child is removed from
her home, if a state wishes to return her to her family, it must rely
primarily on state and local funds to pay for any services provided
to the family or for monitoring of the home. In contrast, if a state
keeps the child in foster care, it will continue to receive federal
funding. 93 Accordingly, states which are interested in preserving
would actually benefit from a continued legal relationship with their biological parents, the
State now permits children, in limited circumstances, to file petitions to reinstate parental
rights. Child advocates have praised this legislation. "At minimum, it allows juvenile courts
to correct a mistake that does not benefit a child who is never adopted. As lawyers representing children ... we owe it to them to use all [of] our talents, both legal and legislative, to
find creative ways to repair their families when possible and not subject them to the unhappy consequence of life as a permanent legal orphan." Camerin Schmidt & Brenda
Dabney, Restoring ParentalRights: Giving Legal Orphans a Chance at a Family, 21 CHILD LAW
PRAC. 169, 171 (2007).
89.
42 U.S.C. § 672(a) (3); see also PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, TIME FOR REFORM: Fix
THE FOSTER CARE LOOKBACK 1-7 (2007), http://kidsarewaiting.org/reports/files/
lookback.pdf (describing the problems in funding created by tying a child's eligibility to
federal funding under the now defunct Aid to Families with Dependent Children program).
As a result of this "lookback provision," federal funding for foster children declined by 1.9
billion dollars between 1998 and 2004 and the number of children eligible for federal funding is expected to decline by five thousand each year. Id. at 1. Many groups, including the
National Governor's Association, the American Public Human Services Association, and the
Child Welfare League of America have called for the elimination of this provision.
90.
MURRAY, supranote 36, at 2.
91.
Id. at 3.
92.
Id. at 2.
93.

Many organizations and commentators have criticized the current funding incen-

tives but little change has occurred. See, e.g., CORNERSTONE CONSULTING GROUP, INC., CHILD
WELFARE
WAIVERS:
PROMISING
DIRECTIONS,
MISSED
OPPORTUNITIES
13 (1999),
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familial relationships through subsidized guardianships or reunifications are left to generate their own funds, whereas those that
look to increase adoptions are supported through federal incentive
payments. 94 Not surprisingly, since the passage of the ASFA, adoptions have increased by fifty-seven percent nationwide. 95 As
summarized by Gary Stangler, executive director of the Jim Casey
Youth Opportunities Initiative, "[t]he only way [for states] to get
federal money is if a child is in foster care. The irony is, the more
successful [states are], the more they get punished."9 Innovation is
discouraged and the status quo is perpetuated.
The federal government recognized the disincentives to innovate created by its funding streams, and in 1995 attempted to
remedy the problem by creating a process by which states could
apply for waivers from the federal government to use IV-E monies
to fund innovative demonstration projects. 9 The initial legislation
established waivers in ten states, and in the ASFA, the process was
expanded to allow as many as ten waivers in each fiscal year.9 Since
1995, the waivers have been used to pilot a host of programs including subsidized guardianships, community-based supports for

http://www.cornerstone.to/images/child.pdf (citations omitted) ("When agencies remove
poor children from their homes, they have unlimited access to Title lV-E funds to keep
them in foster care or institutional placements ....When they try to keep them at home
safely or bring them back home after a temporary placement, however, they must search for
smaller sources of federal funding aimed toward prevention or use state and/or local dollars
to pay for those services."); NAT'L GOVERNOR'S ASS'N, POLICY POSITION-HHS-14: CHILD
WELFARE SERVICES (2006), http://www.nga.org (follow "Policy Positions" hyperlink under
"Federal Relations"; then follow "HHS-14, Child Welfare Services" hyperlink) ("[Tihe majority of federal funding for child welfare programs is targeted towards out-of-home care,
with a much smaller portion of federal funds focused on services that protect child safety,
prevent the need for out-of-home placement, promote family stability or reunification when
appropriate."); CHRISTIAN & NAT'L CONF. OF ST.LEGIS., supra note 36, at 18 (observing that
"funding for foster care is an open-ended entitlement, whereas funds for prevention, family
support and treatment are capped at a level that is insufficient to meet the complex needs of
children and families").
94.
Under the ASFA, states receive $4,000 for each completed adoption over an initial
baseline and $6,000 for adoptions of special needs children. 42 U.S.C. § 673b (2000). As
noted above, no such incentives exist for completed guardianships or successful reunifications.
95.
U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., FOSTER CARE: RECENT LEGISLATION HELPS STATES FOCUS
ON FINDING PERMANENT HOMES FOR CHILDREN, BUT LONG-STANDING BARRIERS REMAIN 3
(2002). "During the first five years of the Adoption Incentives Program, adoptions from
foster care increased substantially, from 31,000 in 1997 to approximately 51,000 in 2002. In
all, an estimated 238,000 adoptions were completed during this time." FOSTERING THE FUTURE, supra note 68, at 32.
96.
Tackett, supra note 68.
97.
See CORNERSTONE, supra note 93, at 7.
98.
Id.
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families, and post-adoption assistance to families, such as therapy
and case management.
Unfortunately, the legislation creating the waiver program has
not been reauthorized. Thus, no waiver process currently exists,
and states can still only apply 1V-E funds to cover costs associated
with foster care and adoption.'00 Even when the program existed,
however, severe restrictions curtailed its effectiveness. Only a few
states could apply for waivers per year and each waiver was limited
to five years.'0 ' Thus, states looking to initiate comprehensive reforms were discouraged because federal funding for the
innovations would disappear after five years. 02 Additionally, states
applying for waivers could not replicate reforms in another state
and thus the impact of successful projects, such as subsidized
guardianships, was extremely limited.' 03 The Department of Health
and Human Services prohibited similar waiver projects due to fear
that similar innovations might constitute "policymaking through
the back door" and create a de facto shift in the way federal funds
are spent, regardless of whether such a shift actually benefited
children. 01 4 Complex bureaucratic and administrative procedures
also deterred states from utilizing the process.' 5 At least five states
withdrew their waiver proposals at some point in the process, and
several states decided not to submit applications because they had
determined that the waiver process was too complex, rigid, and
time consuming.' Some of these states withdrew because of limits
0 7
that were placed on the proposed project's scope and innovation.
Regardless, the waiver program no longer exists, and states are
99.

Id.

at

also HOME AT LAST, CHILD WELFARE FINANCE
(2006), http://www.pcsao.org/InTheNews/HomeAtLast/
06ChildWelfareFinancingStraightjacketTightens.pdf ("During the past ten years, 18 states
have implemented 26 child welfare waiver demonstrations to test innovative programs and
services, including subsidized guardianship, flexible funding to local agencies, managed
care, substance abuse services, intensive preventive services, and tribal administration of
federal child welfare funds.").
100. HOME AT LAST, supra note 99, at 1 (stating that on March 31, 2006, the authority of
the federal government to grant waivers in the use of federal child welfare funds will come
to an end and that without the waiver, Title IV-E funds can only be used to support children
who have been removed from home and placed in foster care).
101. CORNERSTONE, supra note 93, at 7.
102. Id. at 35.
103. Id.
STRAIGHTJACKET

104.

81-91;

TIGHTENS

see

1

Id.

105. Additionally, each state with a waiver had to develop an outside evaluation of the
project's effectiveness and had to be cost neutral. Id. at 8.
106. Id. at 33.
107. Id. The Cornerstone study found that national, state, and local experts agreed that
there was no clear vision on the federal level for how the waivers contributed to child welfare reform. Id. at 32.
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permitted no flexibility to use federal funds for innovative ideas to
reform the child welfare system.
These issues typify how policy judgments, traditionally within the
purview of state and local governments, have been removed from
the discretion of the states by the federal government's dominance
over child welfare issues. A one-size-fits-all approach to child welfare has enveloped the nation, yet little evidence exists that this
approach is necessarily the most effective. In addition to displacing
the ability of states to make certain policy decisions regarding child
welfare, federal involvement has also stifled innovation by overburdening child welfare agencies, which devote scarce time and
resources to complying with a complicated and detailed set of federal regulations and statutes. . Trainings to ensure that courts and
agencies are ASFA-compliant are prevalent, and states spend considerable time self-monitoring their compliance with federals laws
to ensure compliance. A hypersensitivity about violating federal law
abounds. For example, recently, the Michigan Department of Human Services sent a letter to a lawyer representing a child stating
that the child was deemed ineligible for federal funding because
0 The
the petition in her court case was not read on the record.'O
letter further stated that the problem would be remedied in the
future by a requirement that all petitions be read at the initial
hearing of the case."0 Though no such requirement actually exists
in federal regulations and has little to do with the best interests of
a child, the vignette typifies the level of paranoia state child welfare
108. See, e.g.,
TIME FOR REFORM, supra note 89, at 6-7 (observing that "[c]hild welfare
administrators, caseworkers, and federal auditors struggle to amass the documents needed
to determine a child's eligibility and complete reimbursement procedures." This "is a complicated process that consumes time and energy that otherwise could be spent on serving
abused and neglected children and their families." Further, "[p]aperwork requirements
have a direct impact on caseworkers' ability to spend time with children and families, a critical element in the delivery of quality social services."); Mark Hardin, Impact of the Adoption
and Safe Families Act (ASFA) on Judicial Resources and Procedures, http://
www.abanet.org/child/impact.shtml (last visited Sept. 6, 2007) (observing that ASFA requirements would create new demands on state court resources); Nat'l Conf. on St. Legis. et
al., Comments to HHS Regarding Child Welfare Regulations: Letter to Carol Williams, Association Commissioner of the Children's Bureau (Dec. 17, 1998) ("Paperwork and process
are important to ensure certain protections for children, but are meaningless and a misdirection of limited resources when they do not comport with outcomes."). Even the
Department of Health and Human Services has concluded that "'it is not clear at all that the
time and effort spent tracking eligibility criteria results in better outcomes for children."'
TIME FOR REFORM, supra note 89, at 7 (citations omitted).
109. Letter from Michigan Department of Human Services, Genesee County Children's
District, to University of Michigan Child Advocacy Law Clinic (May 5, 2006) (on file with
author).
110. Id. ("The Department of Human Services and the Genesee County Family Court
have taken steps to ensure that all petitions are read into the record to avoid problems like
this in the future.").
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officials experience when trying to comply with burdensome federal mandates.
This paranoia has been heightened by recent federal audits
which resulted in findings that the majority of states were not in
substantial conformity with federal child welfare laws."l ' Consequently, a number of states have been given a limited amount of
time to develop program improvement plans to remedy their
technical deficiencies. A failure to adhere to such plans may result
in losses of tens of millions of dollars-a risk no state can afford to
take. In the current climate, when faced with a new and creative
proposal to reform the system, states often ask the wrong question.
Rather than inquiring whether the reforms further the interests of
children, the first question child welfare agencies ponder is how
the proposal may affect compliance and funding under Title IV-E.
The preoccupation with maximizing federal funding has pervaded state court decision-making as well. Traditionally, a
distinguishing feature of the dependency system has been the
broad discretion vested in juvenile court judges, who act as parens
patriae to the child."2 The judge possesses vast discretion to craft
remedies suited to the individual child before her and is given
broad authority to develop creative solutions to address the needs
of the entire family. Dependency judges have the flexibility to issue
court orders based on a very subjective standard-the best interest
of the child-because of the uniqueness of each case and the impracticality of applying generic rules and policies to address
specific situations. By meeting the family and the child, and hearing information presented to her by all the parties, the juvenile
court judge is best situated to make a decision in the child's interests.
Yet, today, the independence of the judiciary is being compromised and the role of the family court judge is being transformed.
Many state court judges, facing intense political pressure to avoid
taking any actions that jeopardize federal funding, are forced to
focus not on the best interests of the child but on maximizing federal dollars. Although the ASFA is not binding law on dependency
judges," 3 courts are directed to "collaborate" and develop close
111. See Kernan, supra note 15.
112. See Ventrell, supranote 27, at 132-42 (discussing the juvenile court's parens patriae
functions).
113. The ASFA is a federal funding statute, enacted under Congress' powers under the
Spending Clause of the Constitution that imposes obligations on state child welfare agencies
who receive federal funds. The ASFA is not substantive law that state courts must follow. See
42 U.S.C. § 678 (2000) (permitting state courts to take any action necessary to protect the
health and safety of a child in a particular case).
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partnerships with state agencies to ensure judicial compliance with
the various provisions in the ASFA." 4 States have developed handbooks, established task forces, and drafted extensive protocols
between the two groups defining the new relationship. For example, after the State of Kansas failed a federal audit in 1999, juvenile
court judges and state child welfare officials worked closely together to determine why the federal government gave them a
failing grade and how court orders could be re-drafted to increase
the likelihood of satisfying federal regulators. 5 In Iowa, the courts
and executive agency officials entered into a memorandum of
understanding that each would work together before making "any
changes in process or procedure that may have impact on the
agency or the court's performance and the state's ability to comply
with federal regulations."''" Similarly, in West Virginia, there has
been agency and court collaboration to provide a set of Title IV-E
form orders for judges to use in child protection cases." 7 A primary
focus of judicial activities and decision-making is centered on ensuring that the State not lose any federal funding.
This transformation raises concerns about the quality of judicial
decision-making. Judges now spend what limited time they have
114. Judges, policy-makers, and other child welfare professionals have all emphasized
the need for "collaboration" in the post-ASFA era, emphasizing that the complexities presented by a
child welfare proceeding demand a new role for the judiciary. See CECILIA FLERMONTE & NANCY
SIDOTE SALYERS, IMPROVING OUTCOMES TOGETHER: COURT AND CHILD WELFARE COLLABORATION

1, 1 (Fostering Results 2005), http:// www.fosteringresults.org/results/reports/pewreports_06-2205_improvingoutcomes.pdf ("[T]oo often, the court and the agency work on their common
goals independently of one another."); National Child Welfare Resource Center on Legal
and Judicial Issues, http://www.abanet.org/child/rclji/cfsr/home.html (last visited Sept. 6,
2007) (describing various ways in which judges and executive agency officials have collaborated on child welfare issues). Fiermonte & Salyers cite Judge Nancy Salyers, former
Presiding Judge of the Cook County Juvenile Court's Child Protection Division, as stating,
"'[clollaboration between courts and agencies is in the best interests of the child for whom
they share responsibility. When courts and child welfare agencies work together, share information, and engage in activities like cross-training, children can attain the safety, security
and permanence they need."' FIERMONTE & SALYERS, supra, at 2; see also Judith S. Kaye,
Making the Case for Hand-On Courts, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 11, 1999, at 13 (Judicial
"[c]ollaborations with government agencies and community groups are essential."); AnthonyJ. Sciolino, The ChangingRole of the Family CourtJudge: New Ways of Stemming the Tide, 3
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 395, 407 (2005) ("The hallmarks of this [post-ASFA]
project are judicial leadership and close collaboration between the Court, the Department
of Social Services, foster care agencies, service providers, and the legal community").
115. See generally National Child Welfare Resource Center on Legal and Judicial Issues,
http://www.abanet.org/child/rclji/home.html.
116. Memorandum of Understanding from the Iowa Department of Human
Services-Judicial Branch Cooperation 1 (Nov. 2005), http://www.abanet.org/child/rclji/
2005mouiowa.doc (last visited Sept. 6, 2007).
117. Nat'l Child Welfare Res. Ctr. on Legal and Judicial Issues, Information About
Court and Agency Collaboration on the CFSR, http://www.abanet.org/child/rclji/cfsr/
home.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2007).
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preoccupied about complying with federal funding statutes, rather
than seeking individualized solutions to the specific problems a
family is facing. Standard court forms, which are constantly changing to appease federal regulators, have been redrafted to contain
ASFA buzz phrases like "contrary to the welfare of the child" and
"reasonable efforts,"" 8 and judges spend much of the hearing making sure that the right box has been checked. These phrases,
however, carry little meaning. These terms, which lie at the heart of
the ASFA, are not defined by federal law and are ill-defined in state
statutes.1" ' A recent case in Michigan exemplifies the vacuousness
of these terms. After a family court judge had ordered that two
children be returned to their mother and the child protective case
be dismissed, the judge contradictorily required in his written order that the agency make "reasonable efforts ... [to] reunify the
family" and found that it was contrary to the welfare of the children to return home, even though the children were returned
home. 20 Meaningless box-checking to comply
with federal man12
dates predominates during these hearings.
Additionally, the judge's responsibility to serve as a check against
overreaching and poor decisions by executive agencies is being
compromised by federal involvement. As noted above, in the postASFA era, family court judges are developing close, collaborative
relationships with child welfare agencies and are becoming in118. See, e.g., id. (describing how in Kansas, after the state failed an initial audit, courts
and agency officials worked together to conduct a range of activities including drafted mandated court orders in juvenile cases).
119. See Rollin et al., supra note 23, at 154 ("Defining what constitutes 'reasonable efforts' in a way that is truly helpful and provides practitioners with the guidance they need
has proven elusive.").
120. See Order After Pretrial Hearing, In reVernon, No. 06459380 (Mich.Jud. Cir. Fain.
Div. Dec. 13, 2006) (on file with author).
121. David Herring made similar observations after the enactment of the AACWA. He
observed that:
[T]he reasonable efforts requirement was not vigorously enforced, or even mentioned, in many case review hearings. Overwhelmed attorneys and judges did not
have the time or the inclination to explore the adequacy of the agency's efforts. None
of these actors had an interest in jeopardizing federal foster care funds. Thus, decisionmakers in many systems developed 'form' court reports and court orders that
included a preprinted statement finding that the agency had made reasonable efforts. This compliance in form was sufficient to pass a federal audit of case files and to
keep federal dollars flowing into the jurisdiction, but it surely did not live up to the
spirit of the AACWA.
Herring, supra note 12, at 335. Herring concluded that policy-makers simply "constructed
procedural mechanisms and systems of documentation that assured the flow of federal
funds under AACWA" but they "failed to make and implement decisions that would achieve
timely permanent placements for children." Id. at 336. This meaningless process has only
worsened since the passage of the ASFA.
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vested in a process with a primary focus on maximizing federal
funds. A natural consequence of this collaboration and investment
in an extra-judicial policy matter is that judges often appear paralyzed by a fear of taking any action against a child welfare agency
that mayjeopardize funding, regardless of what the law requires.122
For example, even when confronted with clear evidence that a
child welfare agency has failed to make reasonable efforts to
preserve a child's placement with a parent, judges are extremely
reluctant to issue such a finding out of fear that it will result in a
cut in federal funding. 123 Under federal law, if a judge does not
make a finding that reasonable efforts have been made within sixty
days of removal, children are permanently ineligible for federal
funding for the duration of their stay. 24 No judge wishes to put a
State in this type of fiscal bind, precisely the type of outcome that
122.

Herring further elaborates that:

[I]t is essential to recognize the pressures faced by state juvenile court judges. These
judges serve local constituencies, often facing local elections to gain and retain office.
Under such conditions, judges do not have a strong incentive to enforce federal law
requirements ... that can only have negative consequences for their local constituents-the loss of federal funds for seemingly essential child welfare services and
foster care placements. Lax enforcement allows the system to continue its operations
and maintain an acceptable status quo. It is understandable that these judges believe
that the local system may not be the best for children, but that it is better than the system that would result from a loss of funds caused by their vigorous enforcement of
federal law.
Acting under this belief, state judges regularly find ways to close their eyes to the subversion of federal law requirements even when their state's legislature has
incorporated the federal requirements into state law. They allow the system to construct mechanisms that comply with federal and state law in form, but not in
substance (e.g., preprinted statements concerning the adequacy of the agency's efforts). This compliance in form allows the system to pass a federal file audit, but does
not serve childrens' interests as intended.
Id. at 342.
123. In a statewide survey ofjudges in Michigan, 90.4% stated that they either rarely or
never find that the child welfare agency failed to make reasonable efforts to prevent the
removal or reunify the child. MUSKIE SCH. OF PUB. SERV. & ABA CTR. ON CHILD. & LAW,
MICHIGAN

COURT

IMPROVEMENT

PROGRAM

REASSESSMENT

105

(2005),

http://

www.courts.michigan.gov/scao/resources/publications/reports/ClPReassessmentReport09
0605.pdf.
In another survey, when asked what factors limit ajudicial determination of negative reasonable efforts, 36.3% of the respondents reported that the complexity of Michigan's system
of funding child welfare services was a factor. ABA CTR. ON CHILD. & LAW & NAT'L CTR. FOR
ST. CTS., MICHIGAN COURT IMPROVEMENT PROJECT ASSESSMENT OF PROBATE COURTS' HANDLING

OF CHILD ABUSE AND

NEGLECT CASES

93 (1997), http://courts/michigan.gov/

scao/resources/publications/reports/cipaba.pdf. Michigan's system of funding to support
foster children, similar to the structure of other states, "creates a disincentive forjudges and
referees making negative reasonable efforts determinations." Id. at 93-94.

124.

45C.F.R§ 1356.21(b) (2006).
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the collaborative team, of which the judge is a member, is trying to
avoid. Similarly, a common misconception among judges is that
the ASFA regulations prohibit them from ordering specific placements of children in foster care (e.g., a specific foster home). Even
when confronted with evidence that state law affords them this authority and federal regulations do not prohibit it, judges are loath
to act, particularly when faced with an argument by a state official,
a member of the team to which they are beholden, that the ASFA
will be violated by the issuance of such an order. Similar paralysis
occurs when discussing a wide variety of issues including setting
permanency goals, ordering services for a child, and determining
when a child may emancipate from the foster care system. Federal
laws have altered the balance of power in child protective proceedings, as the judiciary, a crucial check monitoring executive action,
appears reluctant to act against child welfare agencies due to a fear
of doing anything that may jeopardize funding under federal statutes. The long-venerated status of a dependency judge as protector
of the child is being transformed into the protector of federal
funding.
The overall effect of federal involvement in the child welfare system has been a mixed blessing. Though the federal government's
efforts have significantly increased funding for child welfare systems, induced the states to act, and brought considerable attention
to the plight of abused and neglected children, today, its dominant
role in the process is suppressing innovation and creativity of both
state legislatures and juvenile court judges. The next Section argues that the federal government must revisit its role in addressing
these issues and must establish limits over the next thirty years to
scale back its current micromanaging of states' child welfare systems so that these systems remain flexible enough to confront the
complex challenges facing vulnerable families.

III.

THE APPROPRIATE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
IN ADDRESSING CHILD WELFARE ISSUES

A comprehensive plan delineating the federal government's role
in child welfare cases is beyond the scope of this Article. 125 What125. A number of policy-makers and academics have issued proposals to reform federal
financing of the foster care system. The proposals range from creating a block grant for
child welfare spending to reducing the rate of federal reimbursement for foster care de-

pending on how long children remain in care. See generally CORNERSTONE, supra note 93, at
35 (describing various funding options); FOSTERING THE FUTURE, supra note 68 (outlining
comprehensive plan to reform the foster care system); Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through
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ever new plan is created, however, must be simple to administer in
light of the bureaucratic burdens pervasive throughout the current
system and must permit states to craft child welfare systems reflective of their constituents' needs. Limiting the federal government's
involvement to the following four areas would achieve these goals:
1) inducing states to act and encouraging innovation through financial support; 2) protecting the constitutional rights of parents
and children; 3) confronting federal issues implicated by the child
welfare system, such as the interstate placement of foster children,
and the effects of federal student loans on attracting and retaining
child welfare professionals; and 4) providing research and technical assistance to help states design their policies. Each of these will
be addressed in turn.
Over the past thirty years, the federal government has spent billions of dollars to support state child welfare systems. Undoubtedly,
this investment has spurred states to create and improve their systems, which prior to federal involvement, were inadequate and
poorly administered. Currently, this funding is indispensable, as it
constitutes the overwhelming majority of funds spent on foster
children in a number of states.12 6 At this juncture, any reduction in

the amount of money spent would irreparably deprive states of the
resources they need to serve children and families. Preserving the
permanently authorized, open entitlement status of IV-E funds is
essential to ensuring that states have the ability to respond to sudden surges in the number of foster children caused by
unpredictable circumstances, such as a heightened poverty, increased substance abuse, or rising criminal activity.
Many of the conditions that federal laws impose on states, both
in terms of mandating specific procedures and restricting how
funds can be spent, must be eliminated so that states have the
autonomy to determine good policies for their citizens. Under this
standard, the federal government would not dictate the policies
that states must implement. The states would maintain the discretion to determine how long a parent should have before her rights
are terminated, or under what circumstances a person should be
licensed as a foster parent and what rights she would receive
should she be successful. The legal jargon that dominates child
welfare discourse would be eliminated, and instead, states would be
Byzantium: The Promise and Failure of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83

MINN.

L.

REv. 637, 689-91 (1999) (arguing that entitlement status of Title IV-E funds should be re-

tained but that federal spending for foster children should decline the longer a child spends
incare).
126. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing states' reliance on federal foster care funding).
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given the flexibility to design unique state laws, as long as their laws
did not violate the constitutional rights of families, a restriction
more fully discussed below.
Additionally, restrictions on the expenditure of federal funds
must be eliminated, and one pool of flexible funding should be
created for states to spend on all costs associated with the child
welfare system, including preventive services, foster care expenses,
reunification efforts, adoptive placements, and post-adoption subsidies. An example of a policy consistent with this idea is the Pew
Commission's recent proposal to combine Title IV-E and 1V-B
funds to create a new pool of flexible funding for states to use towards a variety of purposes. 2 These and other similar proposals
recognize that forcing states to use the funds for a particular purpose, as the current system does, creates perverse incentives for
states to achieve certain outcomes that may not be in the child's
interests. For example, as discussed above, the current system encourages states to keep children in foster care indefinitely or to
place them in adoptive homes even when reunification or guardianship may be more appropriate outcomes. Providing states with
more flexibility will enable them to dedicate additional resources
at points in the case where sustained change in families is more
likely to occur, such as prior to the removal of children from their
homes or after permanency is achieved to stabilize the placement.
The current practice of indefinitely funding children who remain
in temporary foster homes runs counter to the overwhelming evidence which suggests that the state is an inadequate surrogate
parent of children. Instead, states must concentrate their resources
on either preventing children's entry into care or expediting their
exit.
Removing many of the current funding restrictions would also
simplify the process considerably and virtually eliminate the expensive machinery currently in place solely to monitor whether states
are complying with extensive federal laws and regulations. Federal
audits of state systems, in the form of child and family service reviews, would be eliminated, and states would not constantly expend
resources conducting self-assessments, creating new court forms or
training judges to comply with federal laws. Additionally, judges
would no longer be paralyzed by the fear of violating one of many
federal laws or regulations that could jeopardize funding. Savings

127. FOSTERING THE FUTURE, supra note 68, at 20 (arguing for the creation of a Safe
Children, Strong Families Grant which combines the Title IV-B program with the administration and training components of Title IV-E).
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from eliminating this machinery could be reinvested to fund actual
programs and services for parents and children.
Removing many of the current financial restrictions on states
would not risk undermining the constitutional rights of parents
and children. Under the proposed regime, the federal government
would require that states receiving federal funds protect the federal constitutional rights of parents and children. Supreme Court
precedent and decisions from federal courts establish clear protections mandated by the Federal Constitution in child protection
proceedings. For example, biological parents are presumed to be
fit, and children cannot be removed from their homes absent evidence of parental unfitness. 12 If children are removed, parents and

children are entitled to a prompt post-deprivation hearing and a
timely trial on the allegations against them. 129 Once children are
placed in care, the State has a duty to protect them from harm. '
Other areas of constitutional protection may include procedural
rights, including a parent's right to counsel 3' or the provision of
counsel for children. 32
Conditioning receipt of federal funding on these basic constitutional provisions will be easy to administer through both public
and private means. Rather than establishing a complicated system
to monitor state compliance, individuals should be permitted to
direct complaints to either the Children's Bureau of the Department of Health and Human Services or the Department of Justice,
who can then investigate accordingly. Possible remedies could include instituting legal action or depriving states of federal funds. In
the alternative, private causes of action to enforce federal child
welfare statutes should be made explicit, with specific provisions
for attorneys' fees. 133 National organizations like Children Rights,
128. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972) (holding that, as a matter of Due
Process, parents may have a hearing on their fitness as parents before children are removed
from their care).
129. See Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 828 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that failure to
hold prompt post-deprivation hearing violated the parent's due process rights under the
Constitution).
130. See K.H. v Morgan, 914 E2d 846, 849 (7th Cir. 1990); Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 929 F
Supp. 662, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
131. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981) (holding that the
Constitution mandates the appointment of counsel in certain termination of parental rights
cases).
132. See Kenny A. v. Perdtue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1360-61 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (finding
that foster children have a right to counsel in dependency and termination of parental
rights proceedings).
133. Currently, an individual's ability to bring private causes of action under federal
child welfare statutes is unclear. Although the Supreme Court held, in Suter v. Artist M., 503
U.S. 347 (1992), that the "reasonable efforts" provisions in the Adoption Assistance and
Child Welfare Act did not create a private cause of action, id. at 363, lower courts, subseHeinOnline -- 41 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 311 2007-2008
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Inc. and the Youth Law Center have demonstrated a willingness to
utilize impact litigation to force states to reform their systems to
protect the constitutional rights of families.' Encouraging such
actions will create an effective monitoring system without the administrative burdens and expenses that currently exist.
Additionally, public dissemination of data from state child welfare
systems will help generate political pressure for meaningful
change. No evidence exists indicating that the absence of federal
micromanagement of child welfare policy would result in a "race to
the bottom."
Although the federal government's role in dictating the substance of state child welfare laws should be minimized except to
protect federal constitutional rights, federal involvement should be
expanded to address policy concerns that cannot be addressed by
individual states. The interstate placement of foster children is one
example. The median time spent in the foster care system by children in need of out-of-state placements is forty-three months, two
full years longer than the average waiting time for a child with a
potential in-state placement. 135 This disparity exists due to the application of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children
("ICPC"), which imposes significant obstacles for foster children
who have potential placements in another state. Under the ICPC, a
state cannot send a foster child to another state without obtaining
approval from the receiving state agency, which must determine
whether the placement is contrary to the child's interests. 36 If the
quent to that decision, have found other provisions of the AACWA to be enforceable
through litigation. See, e.g., Marisol A. v. Guiliani, 126 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 1997); LaShawn A. v.
Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also Gerard F. Glynn, The Child's Representation Under
CAPTA: It Is Time for Enforcement, 6 NEV. L.J. 1250 (2006) (arguing a private cause of action is
permissible under CAPTA to enforce the requirement that children in foster care proceedings be appointed a guardian ad litem).
134. Information about the systemic reform pursued by these organizations can be
found on their respective websites. Children's Rights, http://www.childrensrights.org/site/
PageServer?pagename=cases (last visited Oct. 22, 2007); Youth Law Center, http://
www.ylc.org/our _work.php (last visited Oct. 22, 2007).
135. See Representative Tom Delay, Remarks Regarding the ICPC (Mar. 29, 2004) (on
file with author).
136. The Compact contains ten articles that define the types of placements and placers
subject to the law, the procedures to be followed in making an interstate placement and the
specific protections, services, and requirements established by the law. Am. PUB. HUMAN
SERVS. ASS'N, GUIDE TO THE INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN 2
(2002), http://icpc.aphsa.org/documents/Guidebook_2002.pdf [hereinafter GUIDE TO THE
ICPC]. Article III of the Compact prohibits a court from sending a child to another state
'until the appropriate public authorities in the receiving state shall notify the sending
agency, in writing, to the effect that the proposed placement does not appear to be contrary
to the interests of the child." GUIDE TO THE ICPC, supra, at 10; see also In reTM.J., 878 A.2d
1200, 1203 (D.C.2005) ("As the ICPC dictates, Maryland's refusal to approve placement of
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agency denies approval, the Compact prohibits a family court from
making the placement. Unfortunately, current practice under the
ICPC is dominated by delays, poor decision-making and unnecessary placements of children in licensed foster homes, instead of
with their families. Although limited proposals to reform the system have been suggested, only minor change has occurred, partly
due to a lack of coordination among the states. The scope of solving these problems is beyond the authority of any individual state,
and the federal government is uniquely situated to address them.
Possible solutions could include direct federal legislation mandating timeframes in which home studies must be completed, 317 a

national resource to track the completion of the studies, and an
administrative process to challenge denials of home studies by
individual states. Such leadership to confront a distinctly federal
issue would be a way in which the federal government could help
foster children without micromanaging individual state child welfare systems.
Another area of possible involvement includes reducing barriers
for professionals looking to enter the child welfare field. A study by
the Pew Commission's Home at Last initiative revealed that crushing student loans deter attorneys from representing children in
protective proceedings. 13 Impediments to recruiting and retaining

attorneys have direct consequences on children's well-being. Often, children may be represented by multiple attorneys during
their cases, which impedes their ability to form meaningful relationships with their attorneys and prevents attorneys from
obtaining a comprehensive understanding of the case. s Similar
problems of entry and retention exist for others working in the
child protective system, such as social workers and therapists who
the child withJ.A. [a relative] barred the [District of Columbia] Superior Court from ordering that disposition.").
137. Recently, Congress passed legislation to improve the timeliness of home studies
under the ICPC. The legislation mandates that States that receive federal funding complete
interstate home studies within 60 days, 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a) (26) (2000), and provides States
with a financial incentive to expedite the home studies. § 673c. Due to how recently this
statute was enacted, it is too soon to determine its effectiveness. For a more comprehensive
analysis of recent efforts to reform the ICPC, see Vivek S. Sankaran, Perpetuatingthe Impermanence of Foster Children: A Critical Analysis of Efforts to Reform the Interstate Compact on the
Placement of Children, 40 FAM. L.Q. 435 (2006).
138. See generally HOME AT LAST, FOSTER CHILDREN MAY BE PAYING A PRICE FOR ATTORNEYS' OVERWHELMING STUDENT LOAN DEBT (2005), http://clcla.org/Images/pdfs/
pdf pew/WHITEPAPERfinal-rev.pdf. The study found that 31.2% of responding attorneys graduated from law school with student loan debt in excess of $75,000 and 40% of
those believed that loans were a significant factor influencing their decision to leave child
advocacy. Id. at 2-3.
139. Id.
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are also poorly paid and shoulder burdensome student loans.
Congress could begin to respond to this crisis by enacting a loan
forgiveness program for dependency professionals who work in the
field for a set period of time. Once again, such action would benefit children, be welcomed by the states and not intrude on their
autonomy to make policy decisions.
Finally, the federal government should continue its work providing research and technical assistance to states. The National
Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect Information, created
in the CAPTA, has provided incredible access to information and
resources for over thirty years.14 The Clearinghouse has disseminated timely research, publicized conferences, and conducted
analyses of state laws and regulations. Additionally, the federal government has funded grants examining various aspects of the child
protective system. This research has played an integral role in educating policy-makers and other professionals and will only gain
importance in the de-centralized child welfare system suggested in
this Article, as state approaches to confront child welfare issues
may vary considerably. The federal government should fund studies examining the different innovations being implemented in the
states, the strengths and shortcoming of those innovations, and
suggestions for future reforms. Rather than mandating what states
must do, federal policy-makers should instead collaborate with
state officials on the effectiveness of state programs and how to improve them. By observing these four limitations, the federal
government will help establish a balance to ensure that states receive sufficient funding to design their child welfare systems while
maintaining the necessary autonomy to implement innovative reforms.

CONCLUSION

The next thirty years certainly will challenge state child welfare
systems in a myriad of ways. The problems of drugs, poverty, mental illness, and crime continue to plague families in this country,
and unfortunately, children suffer disproportionately from the
consequences. Increasingly, however, researchers are developing
creative and innovative strategies to attack these issues, and states
must be given every opportunity to implement them. The federal
140. For more information about the National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect Information, which is now referred to as the Child Welfare Information Gateway, visit
its website at Child Welfare Information Gateway, http://wwwtchildwelfare.gov (last visited
Sept. 5, 2007).
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government must recognize that its universal policies and restrictions for all child welfare systems have not worked, and that a
decentralized process, encouraging states to develop innovative
programs, is the key to success. The recognition that the federal
government is best suited to serve in an "innovative and catalytic
function"1 4 will ensure that families involved in the foster care sys-

tem can benefit from individualized, creative solutions to their
complex problems.

141.

119 CONG. REc. 23,896 (1973) (statement of Sen.Javitts).
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